On Defining Democracy

What is a definition? What must it achieve? And what is it welcome to achieve, but not obliged to?

Looking at the matter modestly, a definition should be shorter than any description of that what it is the definition of. And to be shorter, it has to include some aspects of the subject at hand and exclude others; usually, exclude most. If so, then the next obvious question is: what must and what may. Sophists speak here of necessary and contingent. Often, the choice is a question of brevity and elegance.

One of the clearest illustrations here is, I think, Euclid’s geometry. It sets out with a short list of definitions (called axioms: unproved) to construct a magnificent set of (proved) conclusions from the axioms; these conclusions are called theorems. Euclid’s is one of mankind’s greatest achievements.

But there is a serpent in this garden of Eden. With Euclid you can master everything on earth – except the earth itself. The earth’s curved surface is not accessible to Euclid because its properties contradict the theorem (inferred from definitions) on parallel straight lines.

There are two ways of tackling this problem. (1) Throw out the said theorem and save the rest. But in throwing one out we ruin it all. Or else (2) we can leave Euclid as it is and construct a non-Euclidian geometry precisely to answer Euclid’s shortcoming (parallels etc.). And this second method is now followed to deal with curved spaces. And for everything else, Euclid continues to be the “ultimate truth”. Were we to extend Euclid to accommodate curvature, the entire edifice would fall flat. In other words: we have here too a – happy – instance of less being more.

Now to democracy. One essential question is how concise a definition of democracy ought to be. Let me pick out two areas of great significance:

1. What happens between elections?
   There are so many instances of democratic elections followed by dictatorial usurpation of power, jettisoning of parliament, cancelling of next elections etc. Democracy in other words does – obviously – not imply its sustenance. But still I would rather go for a definition (axiom) which ousts governments via free ballots – and does very little else. The rest then would be left to follow as theorem from this initial axiom. Democracy presupposes freedom but does not entail (postsuppose) freedom’s continued existence.

2. What if there is very little to choose between contesting parties?
   What if we are stranded between the devil and the deep blue sea?

To 1) and 2). Indeed, my democracy (actually it is not mine, it is Popper’s definition) does not deter our Hitlers and Honeckers, and so many others not. Nor does it automatically solve the impasse between the devil and the deep blue sea. Is my democracy then elegant but useless? Well, I think not. The “free ballot” (axiom) saves the day, I daresay. Freedom means individual and independent choice. And this choice both anticipates and implies justice, press, parliament (theorems). And out of free-flowing information emerges, always, a further choice beyond the devil and the perilous sea. And this coalition of individuality with freedom is precisely my definition of (political) liberalism. In other words:

free ballots <=> liberal democracy

Strictly speaking therefore, “liberal democracy” is a tautology. Some surely come to power via free ballots; but a dictator to be worth his name subsequently suspends ballots. To some, liberal belongs to the axiom of democracy, to me, liberal is a vital theorem following from that axiom.